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ABSTRACT 
The declining price of seaborne coal since 2011 has placed enormous pressure on the 
Australian coal industry, slashing profits and forcing mine closures. This report aims to 
determine whether Australian exporters can expect a recovery in seaborne price and demand 
in the period to 2020. It was determined that demand from China and India would be the most 
important variable in determining seaborne price. Both countries are major importers pushing 
towards changing their energy mix. They also have access to low cost domestic coal supply 
and are looking for greater energy security in a tense political climate. 
With the viability of the Australian industry hinged on these two countries, two key drivers 
within China and India were found to determine their demand for coal. These were: 
 growth in renewable energy; and
 availability of domestic coal.
From these, a matrix of four possible export futures was produced, based on outcomes of either 
growth outperforming expectation or stagnation in each of the drivers. This model is based on 
the original scenario planning model employed by Royal Dutch Shell from late 1960’s, 
adjusted to allow an accurate representation of possible scenarios for Australian coal towards 
2020. The futures were the coal intermediary future, the security future, the renewables future 
and the import future. Likely consequences of these futures were analysed and used to develop 
risk weightings rated at ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high’ for both thermal and metallurgical demand 
from China and India. The risk weightings showed thermal coal to be at greatest risk of low 
future prices and reduced demand. Three of the four futures saw risk ratings of ‘medium’ to 
‘high’ for Australian thermal exports. By contrast, metallurgical exports to India were 
consistently rated ‘low,’ leading to a more positive future price outlook. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The Australian coal industry has been the subject of falling seaborne prices since peaks in 2011, 
affecting both thermal and metallurgical coal exports. Driven by Chinese demand, thermal 
prices have since declined 55 per cent while metallurgical prices have fallen nearly 70 per cent. 
The decline, based on the Newcastle and Queensland spot prices respectively, is illustrated in 
Appendix A (NAB, 2016). Earnings across the industry have matched the falling price, with 
expenses remaining consistent with peak 2011 levels. As a result, the industry has been in 
decline, experiencing sector-wide losses in the 2015 financial year. The problem is outlined 
with the industry performance graph in Figure 1 (ABS, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1: Performance of the Australian coal industry since 2011 
 
From its position geographically and a lack of sufficient domestic demand, Australian coal 
futures are directly tied to the Asian market. Traditionally, exports have been dominated by 
China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. From these five key partners, China and India 
are likely the greatest future drivers of seaborne prices and Australian export profitability. More 
than any of the other countries, these two are at the risk of reducing import quantities and 
slashing demand in the market, largely due to: 
 a desire to alter coal-dominated power mixes; 
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 low cost domestic supply of coal; and 
 government drives towards self-sustainability for economic growth and security. 
 
As the world’s two largest countries and largest coal importers in 2015, China and India have 
a significant bearing on seaborne prices. Both rank fairly low on the economic development 
index, with massive scope for increasing energy consumption as shown in Figure 2 (Penney & 
Cronshaw, 2015). With growth inevitable, the requirement for imported coal in the new energy 
mix will directly impact on the viability of Australian export coal. 
 
 
Figure 2: Electricity use versus GDP per capita 2012 
 
Both the Chinese and Indian governments have planned for major shifts in their energy mix to 
begin taking effect in the immediate future. Increasing international climate pressure, 
culminating in the Paris energy accords of late 2015, has combined with low renewables 
installation costs in both countries to make wind and solar viable alternatives to coal. While 
both have committed to large renewables growth, domestic coal supply remains an important 
factor in both China and India. Whether to boost to the local economy, or as a reflection of the 
value of self-sufficient energy production, both are looking to reduce imported coal. China 
produces around 50 per cent of the world’s coal, with longwall techniques leading the world 
and allowing production on an unprecedented scale. India, while currently lacking high levels 
of mechanisation, also has access to large, shallow deposits to fuel a drive towards self-
sufficiency. The low cost of domestic operations, combined with a desire to limit imports, 
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creates a credible risk that China and India could reduce their share or completely exit the 
seaborne thermal and metallurgical markets. The potential of such a move highlights the 
vulnerability of Australian coal miners, who rely on positive price pressure from these 
countries to make their operations viable.  
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This project was commissioned with the aim of providing an indication of seaborne prices to 
the year 2020. In preliminary research, the direction of Chinese and Indian demand for import 
coal was deemed vital in analysing coal futures. As such, the report was constructed with a 
focus on these two countries, however the primary aim was to relate back to the viability of 
Australian industry. The objectives of the project can be summarised as follows: 
 prediction of energy mix in China and India to 2020; 
 analysis of coal demand in China and India under the new energy mixes; 
 assessment on whether demand will be met internally or with the use of exports; 
 effect of the Chinese and Indian direction on seaborne coal prices, for both thermal and 
metallurgical products; and 
 final assessment on value of the Australian industry under the new energy mixes. 
1.3 SCOPE AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The report was focused on providing an assessment on the future viability of the Australian 
coal industry through an analysis of demand from China and India. The viability of Australian 
industry would be assessed solely on the seaborne price, with an assumption that increasing 
earnings and not reducing expenses was the key to industry profitability. Given the importance 
of both thermal and metallurgical exports to the industry, both were included in the report. 
However, with greater variability expected in thermal demand, the report was focused on this 
area unless metallurgical coal is specifically mentioned. As a research report, the scope of the 
project was limited to sources freely accessed from the public domain. The scope of the project 
was further limited by the following assumptions: 
 where disparity in figures was experienced the weight of collaborating evidence 
determined the values presented; and 
 changing demand from export partners other than China and India was not considered. 
Any further assumptions required through the report were identified where applied. 
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1.4 METHODOLOGY 
In preliminary research it was also found that industry reports on the direction of China and 
India’s power mixes varied greatly in their assessments. Even with access to privileged 
information and greater scope for data collection, these reports regularly came top opposing 
conclusions. The variance in reports made it impossible to achieve a meaningful or likely result 
in predicting Australian coal futures. As such, a new method was proposed based on an industry 
scenario planning model, utilising key drivers in a matrix format to predict possible export 
futures. Key drivers could be accurately determined from research into the history of the energy 
mix in China and India and the chance of new government proposals and private investment 
altering historic trends. 
 
For a realistic assessment, key drivers were broad and qualitative. While numeric predictions 
from industry reports that supported each export future were included, these were for reference 
only. Providing quantitative assessment on the demand from China and India for Australian 
coal was considered out-of-scope. Using the export futures developed, risk weightings to 
Australian exports were created for each future. Separated by thermal and metallurgical 
varieties, and by country of demand origin, a ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high’ rating was assigned 
based on numerical assessment.  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE TO THE INDUSTRY 
With the downward trend of seaborne coal prices over the past five years, and the uncertainty 
surrounding their future, an inquiry into the potential future of the price was considered 
beneficial to Australian coal interests. The demand of China and India has significant effect on 
many Australian operations and these countries are both undergoing energy sector restructures. 
 
Despite this, many Australian sources remain confident that exports will continue to grow. In 
New South Wales – where many of the country’s thermal exports are sourced – government 
assessments have followed a trend of overestimating royalties’ revenues for the past five years. 
A recent revision to the 2016 budget cutting expectations by AU$129million is just the latest 
in a pattern of disparities in predictions against results, which is shown in Appendix B 
(Hannam, 2016).This report is designed to highlight the potential risks inherent in an industry 
which relies on overseas demand for continued viability.  
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2 PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
In completing this report, a risk management plan was developed to ensure delivery of a quality 
product with accurate assessments on the submission date. The project poses several risks, 
mainly surrounding the use of internet based sources from various authors of unknown 
reliability. It requires significant research to be conducted across the Chinese, Indian and world 
markets, identifying both the current state of their energy sectors and the likely progression 
that current policies will dictate. In preliminary research, consistency across sources was 
identified as a major issue, requiring collaboration between several documents and authors to 
properly verify writings. The risk matrix in Table 1 was produced to examine the likelihood 
and consequence of key risks in the research and writing process.  
 
Table 1: 
Rubric used to identify level of project risk 
Likelihood Example Consequence 
High Medium Low 
High Likely to happen over the 
course of the research project 
1 3 6 
Medium May happen at some point in 
the project 
2 5 8 
Low Unlikely to occur during this 
project 
4 7 9 
 
Using the risk matrix as a guideline a second table was produced, seeking to highlight the 
potential consequences of failing to identify and control risk in the research process. It is 
displayed in Table 2. As can be seen, the two items of substantial risk were ‘significant changes 
in the report assessment over the year spent compiling’ and ‘a lack of consistency across 
documents.’ With the project focusing on assessment to 2020, a year represents a significant 
period in which new information can change the report assessment significantly. To avoid 
having this risk impact the project, the report was written focusing on underlying fundamentals, 
including short term results from newspapers as indicators towards goal progression. The 
second major risk, relating to source consistency issues, required extensive research to mitigate. 
In a case where conflicting information was discovered, further enquiry would lend weight to 
one of the arguments and determine an acceptable outcome. A wide variety of sources, many 
very detailed and of high quality, are available on the topic given its importance in world 
economics, allowing this research to be effective.  
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Table 2: 
Risk matrix for completion of the report 
 Risk 
# Risk Controls Con. Likely Score Risk 
1 Significant change in 
assessment during the 
year compiling the 
report 
Acceptance of changing 
indicators. Initial focus on 
underlying drivers rather than 
short term results 
High Med. 2 High 
2 Consistency issues 
across documents 
Corroboration with secondary 
documents to ensure correct 
figures are used. Also an 
indicator of degree of certainty. 
Med. High 3 High 
2 Delay:  circumstances 
related to personal 
issues. 
Early completion of 
assignment work. 
High Low 4 Medium 
3 Delay: circumstances 
related to technical 
issues. 
Early completion of 
assignment work. Thorough 
backing-up of work. 
Med. Low 7 Low 
4 Delay: circumstances 
related to personal 
health 
Early completion of 
assignment work. 
Med. Low 7 Low 
5 Issues in gaining access 
to UQ supervisor for 
feedback and 
consultation 
Regular contact with 
supervisor. Clear and early 
plan to begin semester. 
Low. Low. 9 Low 
6 Inability to find sufficient 
secondary sources to 
corroborate primary 
documents. 
Back-up primary documents. 
Extensive literature review as 
part of stage one. 
Med. Low 7 Low 
 
Unforeseen circumstances around personal issues, technical issues and personal health were 
the other area of risk identified in Table 2. While it is difficult to mitigate the risk in these 
cases, best precautions can be taken with early completion of tasks outlined in Section 1.2.  
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3 FOREIGN POLICY SHIFTS 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
For the continued viability of Australian coal mining operations, a growing export market is 
essential. Despite the overwhelmingly coal-dominated nature of Australian electricity 
generation, local demand is insufficient to drive growth in the industry. Historically, 
destinations such as China, Japan and Europe have dominated Australian coal exports. 
However, with a European drive towards renewables and nuclear power, the future of the 
Australian export industry is Asia, with China and India thought to figure heavily alongside 
Japan.  
 
Since the turn of the century, Chinese investment and demand for raw materials saw Australian 
mining output increase dramatically. Since that time, Chinese demand for iron ore and coal has 
continued to power the industry. A decrease in this demand, amid lower economic growth 
figures in 2013, was largely responsible for the falling commodity prices of the past two years.  
 
India, while in the past only a significant importer of Australian metallurgical coal, was a major 
opportunity for Australian thermal coal exporters to fill the void left by decreasing Chinese 
imports. Rapid industrial growth and inadequate local mining capacity made it an attractive 
potential export partner. However, a change in government in 2014 and a radical program of 
investment into local coal assets and renewable power generation has the potential to limit this 
trading partnership. While Indian metallurgical demand will likely remain strong no matter the 
direction of future growth, an assessment into the likely success of its new power plan is 
relevant to Australian exports. In Section 3, the direction of government investment in both 
China and India is examined in conjunction with energy supply and demand economics to 
provide a context to conduct analysis into future demand. 
3.2 INDIA 
As of 2016, India ranks as the world’s ninth largest economy. It still ranks lowly in terms of 
economic development, with over 53 per cent of the population employed in agriculture. In the 
past decade the Indian economy has seen strong growth even through the Global Financial 
Crisis, consistently performing 2-6 per cent higher than world GDP averages (World Bank, 
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2016). Despite the rapid growth of the past three decades, the country still faces serious 
shortfalls in basic utilities including electricity.  
 
Responsibility for the provision of electricity is shared between the state and central 
governments, creating substantial differences between states in prices, subsidies and access. 
India has the largest rural population in the world, with just under 70 per cent of its 1.25 billion 
citizens living away from urban areas. Of the 300million Indians with no access to power, this 
rural population is worst affected as shown in Appendix C (IEA, 2015). The power sector 
struggles with efficiency, with 81 per cent of the US$10 billion combined sector losses in 2011 
attributed to distribution companies. The massive losses suffered by the sector have meant it 
has twice required central government bailouts this century, first in 2001 and then again in 
2012 (Pargal & Banerjee, 2014). 
 
Coal has been mined in India since the 18th century, traditionally providing the primary source 
of electricity generation. After significant foreign involvement through the 20th century, India 
passed The Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act in 1973, removing offshore interests in current 
mines and rescinding ownership of leases for future projects. A total of eight companies took 
control of all operations, integrated under the state-controlled miner Coal India Limited (CIL) 
and its subsidiary Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL). From an operational 
perspective, nationalisation of the industry contributed to a lack of competition and effectively 
ruled out foreign technological input for decades, leaving the sector in a dangerous state of 
complacency. 
 
India relies on regional trading partners Indonesia, Australia and South Africa to make up for 
supply shortages. In 2015 it overtook China as the world’s largest importer of coal, with the 
200million tonnes imported in that year split as shown in Figure 3 (Kearney, 2015). The lack 
of a substantial Indian coking resource highlights the importance of Australia as a trading 
partner; however, the majority (over 80 per cent) of the market is still for coal used in thermal 
applications. The imported coal is largely used in blending to raise the overall calorific value 
of powerplant input while reducing ash content. 
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Figure 3: Division of Indian coal imports in 2013 
3.3 INDIAN POLICY OUTLINE 
3.3.1 The Made in India Plan 
The 2014 Indian election saw a major shift in the direction of the economy, with a new 
generation of leaders from the Bharatiya Janata Party voted to governance. Immediately, new 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and energy minister Piyush Goyal began implementing changes 
to the energy legislation under a broader plan for industrialisation known as Made in India. 
The wide-scale changes led to many pre-2014 predictions of the Indian energy mix becoming 
outdated, as the leaders began a policy of opening the Indian market to foreign investment. A 
previously unattractive option to investors (ranked 130th out of 189 countries on the World 
Bank’s ‘ease of doing business index’ in 2015), the Made in India plan began opening the 
sectors of mining, gas, ports, railways, renewable energy and thermal power (along with 16 
other sectors) to 100 per cent foreign direct investment (World Bank, 2016). The plan targets 
nation-wide economic growth of 8 per cent annually. 
 
With an outline for massive government spending to be complemented by growing private 
investment in the energy sector, Modi claimed that all Indians would have access to power by 
2019. The expansion in capacity required for this task was to be provided through coal mining, 
accompanied by coal-fired power sector growth and growing employment of renewable power 
sources. Part of the reform included the restructure of the central government’s energy 
portfolio, placing the ministries of coal, power, renewable energy, gas and atomic energy under 
Indonesia
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the one umbrella department. The new National Institution for Transforming India (NITI), led 
by Goyal., is designed to increase cooperation with state governments and consolidate Indian 
power interests. 
 
In coal, privatisation of the industry began with private share issues of 10 per cent stake in CIL 
itself, occurring in 2010 and 2015 and proceeding despite strong protest from employees 
(Witteveen, 2016). While the Indian system of governance places significant power in the 
hands of the 28 provinces, central government laws have been gaining traction based on 
promises of increased labour force participation and economic growth. The most relevant laws 
and policies being enacted by the Modi government relating to coal and energy are outlined in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: 
Modi Government coal policies 
Proposal Advancement 
New taxes on imported and locally mined coal Complete 
Procedures requiring 70 per cent approval of landowners to be eased for 
specific industrial corridors 
Proposal 
2010 10 per cent public offering of CIL Complete 
2015 additional 10 per cent public offering of CIL Complete 
Auction of 204 captive coal blocks to private sector Complete 
Updated rail capacity through 3 major new projects – increase to 1billion 
tonnes by 2019 
In progress 
A$4billion program to roll out meters on distribution transformers, feeders 
and consumers in urban areas 
In progress 
Doubling of inter-regional grid transfer capacity In progress 
Creation of single office to oversee ministries of coal, power and new and 
renewable energy 
Complete 
Speeding up of processes in the land acquisition act to reduce 
environmental clearance time 
Blocked by 
upper house 
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3.3.2 Direction of Power Mix 
India is currently the world’s third largest energy consumer. The power mix is dominated by 
coal, which accounts for 60 per cent of installed capacity, however contributes just under 70 
per cent of final electricity generation (Penney & Cronshaw, 2015) because of lower utilisation 
and availability in renewables assets in particular. Figure 4 shows the Indian power mix by 
source in 2013, highlighting the reliance on coal.  
 
 
Figure 4: Indian power generation by source 2013 
 
Coal will continue to form a vital part of the Indian power mix through 2020, however a drive 
towards renewables also forms a key component of the plan. India has submitted a plan to the 
United Nations Paris Accords to reduce carbon emissions by 33-35 per cent per unit of GDP 
on 2005 levels by 2030. A new taxation program on coal was implemented in 2014 to begin 
this process, applying an additional tariff of INR 100 (approx. US$1.50) a tonne to all imported 
coal. This was followed in 2016 with a doubling of the tax on locally produced coal from INR 
200 to 400 a tonne (King, 2016). The revenue from both domestically mined coal and imported 
product will be channelled into governmental renewable investment, forming the basis of 
around US$2.5trillion in support between 2015 and 2030 (Pashley, 2016). The funding is 
designed to achieve a target of 40 per cent renewables share in the energy mix by 2030, with 
preliminary targets of 100GW of solar power, and 60GW of wind power by the year 2022. 
These targets, along with the planned growth of other non-coal energy sources, are outlined in 
Figure 5 (Indian Ministry of Power, 2016). 
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Figure 5: Non-coal energy capacity to be added in India by 2022 
 
For Made in India targets to be met significant private investment from within India and abroad 
will be required particularly in the case of renewables capital investment. Indian renewables 
represents a massive growth opportunity for private equity, which has already been exploited 
by a number of energy firms in Europe and Japan. The monetary commitment from the 
government has translated into low costs (as little as US$0.06 per kWh) and a lack of barriers 
to entry for both domestic and international firms. In terms of capital investment, costs for 
renewables in India are the lowest in the world, at around US$1.1million per megawatt, a factor 
which is further examined in Section 3.8.2. The importance of small private investment into 
the plan is best demonstrated by the 40GW of rooftop solar planned to 2022, utilising up 
20million host buildings (Verma, 2016). The government is increasingly aiming to subsidise 
small-scale renewable contributions to the power grid, aided by decreasing costs in solar, wind 
and battery technology. 
 
So far the response of investment from venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) has been 
measured, accounting for US$548million of the US$10.2billion invested in India in 2015. 
However, as seen in Figure 6 using data collected by Bloomberg, this figure was second in the 
world to the US and represented growth of 440 per cent on 2014. Investment was sourced from 
a total of 927 deals, almost twice the amount seen in 2014 (Bloomberg, 2016). 
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Figure 6: Investment in renewables from VC and PE in 2015 
 
The final area set to impact on demand for seaborne coal is the development of the Indian 
nuclear industry. With its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and 
subsequent nuclear testing in 1974, India was blocked from the international nuclear 
community. The industry was forced to develop internally, building modestly to 21 reactors 
providing 4.8GW in 2015. However, with the signing of the India Australia Civil Nuclear 
Agreement in November 2015, India has secured supplies to drive its plan to construct 30 more 
reactors supplying 63GW by 2032 – at a cost of around US$65 billion (Topf, 2015).  
3.3.3 Coal Mining Expansion 
With proven reserves of 82billion tonnes, India ranks fifth in terms of total world coal reserves. 
Most of the coal is in the eastern provinces of Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and West 
Bengal, together accounting for 79 per cent of the reserves figure. Around 82 per cent of these 
reserves lie above 300 metres, contributing to an industry largely operated by open-cut 
methods. The industry is dominated by Coal India Limited (CIL), operating 495 working coal 
mines and accounting for nearly 80 per cent of total production in 2015.  
 
The coal mining sector has been target for massive private and government investment as part 
of the Made in India plan, having suffered from diminishing growth since 2009. From 90 per 
cent self-sufficiency in 2005, coal production lagged behind demand and domestic supply 
contributed only 75 per cent of the coal required in 2013 (Winzenried & Gibson, 2015). 
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The Made in India plan involves increased coal production that would see total output reach 
1.5billion tonnes by 2020. This scheme consisted of two basic components. The first was a 
massive increase in the output of the national producer Coal India Limited, from current levels 
of 536milllion tonnes in 2015 to 908million in 2020. The second was based around private 
investment in a deregulated coal industry to make up the 600million tonne required difference, 
as shown in Figure 7 (Kearney, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 7: Indian coal output by source with consumption 2005-20(f) 
 
The planned increase in output is largely dependent on the ability of CIL to meet production 
targets. The company requires annual growth of 18 per cent, however its poor levels of 
efficiency suggests massive scope for mechanisation and movement towards this ambitious 
goal. In many Indian mines, labour-intensive processes remain dominant, resulting in an 
effective output of between 152 and 2,621 tonnes per miner per year. This compares poorly to 
the Australian expectation of over 12,000 tonnes (IEA, 2002). Despite the inefficiencies, Indian 
mines remain very cheap from an operational perspective. CIL in particular benefits from 
lenient environmental regulation, with an estimated 90 per cent of coal production from open 
cast mines on land that will not be reclaimed (Shah, 2015).Combined with relatively shallow 
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deposits and a cheap labour force, relaxed industry standards allow Indian miners to achieve 
very low production costs, shown in the cost curve in Figure 8 (IEA, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 8: Indian mining indicative cost curve 2013 (US$/tonne) 
 
With almost all Indian mines producing at below the price of seaborne imports, greater calorific 
output and lower ash content are the only value adding traits for imported coals. In general, 
Indian coal reserves are sub-bituminous and of poor quality, showing average calorific values 
of 3800-4300kcal/kg and 20-40 per cent ash content (Chandra, 2003). The low value of Indian 
products can be seen in Figure 9, which summarises the energy content of Indian coal mined 
since the turn of the century (IEA, 2015). In the graph Indian coal is broken into high-energy 
(greater than 5,600kcal/kg), mid-energy (4,200-5,600kcal/kg) and low-energy (less than 
4,200kcal/kg). The graphic highlights the economics behind major private sector miners such 
as Adani choosing overseas operations over domestic. As a blending product it can raise the 
efficiency of plants, allowing more advanced reactors to operate at desired levels. With coal 
washing technology still underemployed - India producing just 50Mt of washed coal in 2011 
(IEA, 2012) – the low quality of domestic coal represents a major roadblock in the success of 
the Made in India plan. Without large import tariffs overseas coal may remain popular among 
energy producers. 
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Figure 9: Indian steam coal production by grade 
 
Also vital to the success of the plan is India’s ability to lure investment from the private sector, 
with around 40 per cent of the 2020 production target aimed at non-government producers. To 
be attractive to potential investors, the potential rewards must be linked to perceived risk. In a 
positive sign for the industry, a study undertaken on mining risk factors by the University of 
Oxford rated India as low risk in fields such as the potential for environmental regulation, 
domestic demand outlook and liability in the case of accident or pollution. Despite the high 
potential for protests and activism, India is seen as a fairly attractive prospect for greater 
investment as seen in Figure 10 (Potter, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 10: Mining risk factors 
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3.3.4 Coal-Fired Generator Expansion 
For the massive coal mining expansion planned to 2020 to be utilised, Indian generator capacity 
and total energy demand would have to increase at a similar pace. The original target of the 
twelfth five-year-plan of 2012-17 was 85GW of additional capacity (IEA, 2012), which 
expanded on by the Made in India plan to 289GW by 2022. The original target of the plan was 
short-lived, scaled back by the Indian Power Ministry in April 2016 in light of inadequate 
domestic demand. The success of Coal India Limited in ramping up production since the plan 
was announced has led to large pit-head stocks of around 50million tonnes across the country 
in August 2016. The effect has been further reduction in planned capacity, shown in Figure 11 
which contrasts the central government plans of January 2016 with those just six months later 
in July (Mathiesen, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 11: Reduction in Indian coal energy construction in 2016 
 
While the rate of growth of Indian capacity has been low, the new fleet of large, modern 
generators is still vital to Indian aspirations of self-sufficiency. These plants are expected to 
achieve coal use around 20 per cent less than subcritical plants for a given energy output, while 
emissions are cut by around the same level (Penney & Cronshaw, 2015). With efficiency 
ratings of coal-fired production among the worst in the developed world at 25 per cent (Lazarus 
& Chandler, 2011), the cost efficiencies of new powerplants are vital to Indian progression. 
However, supercritical powerplants have traditionally acquired a higher quality input to 
achieve efficiency. This creates major issues around eliminating imported coal as part of the 
Made in India scheme. 
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3.3.5 Rail Expansion 
India suffers from a geographical separation of coal reserves, located mainly in eastern and 
central India, and centres of demand located in the north and west. Shown in Figure 12 is a 
breakdown of the Indian electrical grid combined with the distribution of its 82million tonnes 
of reserves. Most accessible coal is in the eastern states of Jharkhand, Odisha and West Bengal, 
placing great importance on movement of that product to power generation facilities on the 
western coast. However, the current network is inadequate to serve this purpose, with over 65 
per cent of railway sections on the high-density network running above 100 per cent capacity. 
Even at this level of utilisation, only 55 per cent of CIL coal is transported by rail, with the 
remaining coal largely transported by truck, with estimated costs 30-40 per cent more than the 
rail alternative (Penney & Cronshaw, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 12: Map of India by electrical grid populations with distribution of coal reserves 
 
The growth of mining capacity outlined in the Made in India plan will see the amount of coal 
travelling over 500km from source to generator increase from 70million tonnes to between 127 
and 150million tonnes in the next five years alone (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2016). With 
current year-on-year growth in rail capacity at 0.7 per cent, compared to production growth of 
6-7 per cent, the situation has already resulted in major pithead overflow in early 2016. 
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The much-needed expansion of rail capacity has been incorporated into the Made in India plan, 
funded by a combination of government funds and private investment. Rail freight was 
privatised in 2010 and in December 2012 the Ministry for Railways introduced a participative 
model which encouraged private investment into the construction of railways themselves. A 
total commitment of INR 240billion (US$3.6billion) was announced in August 2016 by the 
Modi Government. The nine projects encompassed by the plan total 1937km of track, with the 
aim of increasing capacity to 1.5billion tonnes by 2020 (Press Trust of India, 2016). 
 
In the short term, to transport the quickly increasing output from eastern coal mines, proposals 
have been made to increase the use of coastal shipping. With existing port infrastructure set to 
be underutilised should imported thermal coal volumes decrease, a report from the Ministry for 
Shipping and Indian Ports suggests coastal transport could increase from 23million tonnes to 
200million tonnes annually by the year 2020 (Rowland, 2016). In Appendix D is a map 
showing the proximity of Indian coal handling ports to both the major basins in the east and 
large population centres such as Mumbai, Chennai and Surat (IEA, 2015).  
 
From an Australian exporters standpoint, the method of transport is largely irrelevant. The 
simple ability of Indian supply to be connected with demand centres will dictate the viability 
of the government drive to curb imports by 2020. With the cost of transport logistics currently 
contributing to 30-35 per cent of costs per unit of electricity generated, the decrease in costs 
caused by an adequate rail network could potentially price import coal (currently tariffed at 2-
2.5 per cent) out of the market.  
3.3.6 Decentralisation of Power 
With its massive rural population, distribution of power remains one of the primary shortfalls 
in the Indian energy system. The national power grid is critically underdeveloped in its ability 
to transfer power between regions, leading to electricity oversupplies in some regions while 
others experience major shortfalls as shown in Table 4. The Indian power sector is broken up 
into five regional grids. The five grids were only completely interconnected in 2013, with 
transfer abilities limited at between 1 and 6.5GW annually (Remme, et al., 2011). The inability 
of the grid to cope with regional transfer highlights the importance of coal transport to the 
major population centres in the north and west. 
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Table 4: 
Position of Indian grids as either oversupplied or at a deficit 
Grid Population Position 
North 369m Deficit 
North Eastern 44m Surplus 
Western 273m Deficit 
Eastern 271m Surplus 
Southern 252m Deficit 
 
As part of the Made in India plan, decentralisation has been identified as a solution to the vast 
numbers of rural inhabitants without power. Under the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti 
Yojna (DDUGJY) project, the central government has identified more than 18,000 villages 
requiring power to achieve a goal of 100 per cent rural electrification by May 2018. Under this 
plan, up to 20 per cent of installed capacity will be off-grid in isolated, village-based systems 
(Verma, 2016). While the plan represents major steps in the electrification of the estimated 
300million people without power in India, it contributes only small amounts to the total power 
mix. In terms of affecting coal imports, the ability of the grid to serve urban areas is a more 
important indicator. 
3.4 INDIAN POLICY EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS 
In analysing the impact of Indian policy changes to date, the breakdown of thermal and 
metallurgical imports is particularly important. With a comparative lack of coking resources, 
the stability of Indian demand for Australian metallurgical coal remains relatively secure. In 
an outline of the Made in India mining growth plan, Energy Minister Goyal outlined that 
metallurgical coal imports would remain untouched pending further exploration into local 
alternatives. Despite the claim, it is unlikely that India has little ability to supply a substantial 
portion of its own coking coal due to a lack of resources. With the massive planned industrial 
growth featured in Modi’s plan, India has committed to triple its steel production by 2025, 
driving an 8 per cent predicted annual growth in coking imports. 
 
Recent trends of Australian exports to India have been positive, reaching record levels of 40Mt 
in 2014. Competing exporters in the US and Canada face large shipping costs to access the 
Indian market. This advantage contributed to Australian exporters riding the recent decline in 
prices better than the competition, and increasing market share from 56 per cent in 2014 to 62 
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per cent in 2015. The trend is likely to continue, with the Indian market predicted to grow in 
size from an Australian perspective in the short to medium term as shown in Figure 13 
(Witteveen, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 13: Historical and projected Australian metallurgical exports by destination 
 
The effect of the Made in India plan on thermal imports is likely to be far more pronounced, 
however the effect on Australian exports is again small. In 2014, Australia exported just 
6.7million tonnes of thermal coal to India from total exports of over 200million tonnes. 
However, while actual losses from a collapse of the sector are small, the cost to Australia coal 
futures is large. The 6.7million tonnes exported in 2014 was nearly three times the 2013 
tonnage (Penney & Cronshaw, 2015). With Indian investment expected by many to open 
Queensland’s untouched Galilee Basin and provide a thermal coal market to replace waning 
demand in China, the effect of Piyush Goyal’s plan for no imports by 2020 is clear. 
 
With the Made in India target of eliminating imports seemingly clear, the pursuit of the 
Carmichael Coal Project by Indian coal giant Adani raises a number of questions. The Adani 
Group is a vertically integrated net of companies holding interests in coal mining, port import 
facilities and power generation, both coal and solar. In an effort to expand its coal-fired power 
operation, already the largest in India at 10.4GW capacity, the company has acquired mining 
leases valued at AU$21.7billion for the Carmichael Project in Queensland’s Galilee Basin. 
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Despite local opposition, the company has acquired port facilities from Glencore and is moving 
towards starting construction in 2017 (Riga, 2016). 
 
The commitment to such a large operation, which could potentially mine coal for 150 years, 
suggests a complete lack of faith in the Modi government drive to stop thermal coal imports 
by 2020. It seems clear that the Galilee basin project is designed to feed the new generation of 
Indian supercritical powerplants, not Indian steel production. Coal quality is insufficient to be 
used in a metallurgical process, with most of the basin rated at a calorific value of 4050kcal 
and 25 per cent raw ash (ABC, 2016). Adani is undertaking enormous risk due to high mining 
costs, notwithstanding the possible risk of Indian government undertakings to reduce imports. 
It points to an Indian business sector predicting little government intervention in the import 
market. 
3.5 CHINA 
The rapid modernisation of China since market reform in 1978 has seen average GDP growth 
in the region of 10 per cent, transforming the nation into one of the great economic 
powerhouses of the 21st century. The incredible growth in GDP has been fuelled by massive 
investment in construction, energy and mining. For nearly 40 years, coal and iron ore have 
fuelled the Chinese “economic miracle”, contributing to a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
US$10.35trillion in 2014. As can be seen in the comparison of GDP in Appendix E (World 
Bank, 2016), China rates well above India in terms of economic development given their 
comparable populations, and is fast approaching the United States as the leading world 
economy. 
 
Figure 14 (Martin, 2014) is provided to illustrate the size of the Chinese market, comparing 
Chinese consumption from 2000 to 2013 to the consumption in the rest of the world. Also 
including Chinese mining production, the scale of the Chinese coal industry is obvious. From 
the graph, the need for Chinese imports is clear, with production lagging behind consumption 
since the turn of the century. At the peak disparity in 2013, Chinese consumption reached a 
high of 4billion tonnes, requiring 341million tonnes of imported thermal coal. While 
consumption has dropped recently, continued commitment to the construction of efficient 
modern reactors, coupled with investment in massive coal mining projects, suggests Chinese 
thermal demand may continue to grow. 
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Figure 14: Coal consumption in China and the rest of world including Chinese production 
 
China’s prominence as a buyer has grown to the point where in 2013 it accounted for a quarter 
of seaborne thermal coal demand. With many coastal power plants in the south-east at liberty 
to source coal from ports or inland deposits, China has become the swing buyer of the world 
thermal trade. Given that Chinese companies will turn to local sources if international prices 
are excessive, the demand effectively places a limit on international prices (Cornot-Gandolphe, 
2014).  
3.6 CHINESE POLICY OUTLINE 
As perhaps the most important driver of demand and investment in Australian thermal and 
metallurgical coal, the direction of the Chinese energy program is linked to the success of 
Australian exporters. The simple economics of supply and demand will drive the future of the 
Chinese industry, with several factors standing out among the others. 
 Growth of the Chinese economy; 
 government investment into the sector; 
 composition of the energy mix; and 
 supply of local coal. 
3.6.1 Energy Demand 
The rate of Chinese GDP growth has slowed since peaking in 2010 at annual levels of above 
10.6 per cent. Data for second quarter growth in 2016 places growth at 6.7 per cent, within the 
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central government target range of 6.5-7 per cent. The decline in growth can be attributed to a 
shifting economic focus, as China begins a transition away from investment-driven growth to 
the consumer-driven growth typical of first-world economies. 
 
While the rate of growth has slowed, the continued transition of much of the population into a 
growing middle class will force energy demand to unprecedented levels. By 2020, China is 
estimated to account for 34 per cent of world energy demand, breaking the flat-lining trend of 
other leading economies shown in Figure 15 (Chu, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 15: Estimated electricity consumption of leading economies 2005-2030 
3.6.2 Government Investment into Sector 
The nature of China’s centrally controlled form of government is that the economics of supply 
and demand can be overshadowed by the direction of State-run investment programs. State-
run companies account for 30 per cent of Chinese corporate assets, yet receive 80 per cent of 
bank loans (Magnier, 2016). In the recent past, the Chinese coal sector has benefitted from 
these programs, allowing it to effectively quadruple output since 2000. 
 
Since 2013, government funding has shifted from the mining and energy sectors. The Central 
Government recently assigned funds for the reallocation of nearly 1.8million workers from 
coal and steel, leading to decreased output in both sectors (Spegele, 2016). Further examined 
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in Section 3.6.4, these industries have been targeted as China attempts to reign-in an oversupply 
of electricity that is set to worsen as the country approaches 2020. 
 
The likely future target of government investment is the service industry. Government figures 
from January 2016 suggest that for the first time in history, services account for more than half 
of economic output, up to 50.5 per cent from 48.1 per cent the year before. In addition to the 
shift to services, lower GDP growth figures have been a necessary sacrifice in the transition to 
a consumer based economy. Consumption accounted for more than two thirds of spending in 
the calendar year of 2015, up 15 per cent from 12-months prior (Magnier, 2016). 
 
For coal imports, the shift away from primary industry and investment-driven growth is an 
indicator of reduced future demand growth. For the metallurgical industry, it is a precursor to 
lower steel production, while the shift away from domestic coal assets suggests reduced 
government support for thermal power generation. 
3.6.3 Direction of Power Mix 
As with the coal mining industry, the direction of China’s power mix is linked to the 
channelling of State funds through priority bank loans. In many Chinese population hubs 
pollution is reaching levels deemed unacceptable by even the traditionally pro-industry Central 
Government. From a public relations standpoint, both locally and internationally, an alternative 
to coal must be employed. November 2014 saw the state council issue the new energy 
development strategic action plan for 2014-2020, which included provisions to cap coal 
consumption at 4.2Gt by 2020 and reduce its share of the energy mix to below 62 per cent 
(Cornot-Gandolphe, 2014). 
 
As a replacement for coal China has increasingly been looking towards renewable energy 
sources. It leads the world in renewables spending, in both development and implementation, 
recently overtaking the two other major world spenders the United States and Europe, as shown 
in Figure 16 (Bloomberg, 2016). In 2015, Chinese investment exceeding US$103billion was 
mainly focused on wind energy, commissioning 29GW of new capacity in onshore projects 
alone.  
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Figure 16: New investment in renewable energy on yearly basis 
 
The start of 2016 saw the central government initiate an emergency ban on not-yet-started coal-
fired power projects. The initiative was designed both to curb an oversupply of electricity 
resulting from record-low domestic coal prices and remove destructive competition to 
renewable alternatives. A new set of central government management rules, released in March 
2016, set an annual minimum purchase guarantee for wind and solar projects, ensuring the 
viability of current installations and future projects. The rules stipulated that any move by fossil 
fuel companies to squeeze out renewables share from the grid would have to be heavily 
compensated. These management rules were implemented along with greater central 
government clarification of roles and responsibilities of central and local regulators. The move 
is a first step to implement China’s nation-wide requirement of 9 per cent non-hydro renewable 
generation by 2020, up from current levels averaging 4.67 per cent in 2015 and just 1.17per 
cent in 2010 (Hong & Song, 2016). 
 
With hydro-power included, the Chinese target for 2020 climbs to 15 per cent of the total power 
mix. The Chinese government has targeted solar and wind power, with new projects set to raise 
total capacity to 100 and 200GW respectively (Chu, 2015). However, while the advancements 
place China at the forefront of modern renewable power, its dependence on coal is unlikely to 
wane in the short to medium term. The country is expected to add some 200GW of capacity 
between 2015 and 2017 through plans begun before implementation of the emergency ban. 
While the added capacity is significant, in context with China’s planned energy growth it is 
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less obvious. Analysis conducted by the Macquarie Group in a 2015 report is presented in 
Figure 17, showing massive planned growth in oil, gas, nuclear and renewables (Holmes, 
2015). 
 
Figure 17: Planned Chinese energy mix through 2025 (millions of tonnes oil equivalent) 
 
The lack of growth forecasted in the coal industry can be largely attributed to a massive 
oversupply issue. The effects of state investment into thermal energy, possibly to create 
superficial growth and unemployment figures, have been reflected in domestic coal prices 
which have fallen dramatically. The effect of the oversupply is obvious when the utilisation of 
coal-fired assets is graphed using data from Spegele (2016) in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18: Utilisation of Chinese thermal powerplants 
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3.6.4 Mining Growth 
In conjunction with a movement away from coal-fired power generation, the Chinese 
government has seemed to signal intentions of cutting mining output. State efforts to diversify 
from were led by a 2016 policy shift looking to close coal mines with an output less than 
90,000tonnes to curb oversupply. Around 4,300 mines will be subject to the new laws 
according to state-owned news agency Xinhua, accounting for around 700million tonnes of 
outdated capacity (Jamasmie, 2016). The implementation of these new policies saw total 
mining output for 2015 down nearly 3 per cent on the previous year’s results. As a reaction, 
Chinese imports of thermal coal in May and June 2016 grew by 7.5 per cent and 13.1 per cent 
respectively (Goodwill, 2016), owed to the increase in local prices.  
 
 However, while short term price for imports has improved in a reaction to the decreased local 
capacity, industry research from BMI suggests that this increase will be short lived. Closures 
of small Chinese mines do little to indicate coming capacity changes – in 1996, nearly 75,000 
mines accounted for just 1.5billion tonnes of coal, while output peaked at nearly 4billion tonnes 
with only 15,000 operating mines in 2013 (Xue, et al., 2015). The EIA predicts that Chinese 
production will recover from the recent decline, continuing to grow until at least 2025 (EIA, 
2016). While the government commitment to close small mines has reduced capacity, State-
owned sources still place capacity of the 11,000 remaining mines at 5.7billion tonnes. The 
closures represent a shift in the coal mining model rather than a permanent reduction in 
capacity. Small, unsafe or unprofitable mines are being replaced by large-scale production 
concentrated in China’s western regions, operated by state-owned companies. Xinjiang, 
China’s westernmost province, contains over 40 per cent of the country’s reserves and stands 
to become a prominent centre of production as part of a plan to shift coal mining westward 
(Cornot-Gandolphe, 2014). 
 
While the central government focus has undoubtedly been the development of domestic assets, 
it is unlikely to eliminate the need for imported coal. In the period of oversupply between 2013 
and 2016, incentives for Chinese companies to invest overseas have been lessened, however 
Chinese policy is predicted to soon shift back to rewarded investment in quality overseas 
deposits (Cornot-Gandolphe, 2014). These companies have significant economic advantage 
over Australian firms, with Chinese subsidies estimated to range in the region of US$1.5-3 per 
tonne (Xue, Wang, Bridle, Gerasimchuk & Attwood, 2015) for domestic supplies and 
domestically-owned imports. This commitment, likely to focus on quality Bowen Basin coking 
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assets, may serve to support local industry however the advantage enjoyed by Chinese miners 
in accessing such a market could further impact Australian miners, subject to a tariff rather 
than subsidies when exporting to China.  
3.6.5 Steel Production 
The shift away from investment driven growth in primary industry has significant implications 
for China’s steel industry, and in turn its use of metallurgical coal. Around 48 per cent of 
China’s end use steel is directed at the construction industry, who’s decline has been the main 
driver of a ten-year price low in 2015. In addition to a slowing domestic property industry, 
many large economies have sought to tariff Chinese steel out of their import markets. Tariffs 
of 20 per cent in India, 46 per cent in Britain and 236 per cent in the US are just some examples 
of a global trend to reduce the use of cheap Chinese steel. The decline in demand has forced a 
decrease in output, with China cutting 45million tonnes from its current capacity of 1.1billion 
tonnes annually in 2016 and 140million tonnes by 2020 (Pham, 2016). 
 
While the short term indicators are worrying from an Australian exporters perspective, the 
outlook for steel production in the long term is relatively positive. Producing nearly half the 
world’s total steel, the size of the Chinese market and its significant government subsidies 
better insulates it from temporary downturns in demand. The Chinese urban population is 
expected to grow by another 250million people in the next 20 years, driving resurgence in the 
construction industry. Compared to Australian thermal products, demand for Australian 
metallurgical coal is likely to stay more consistent (McKay, 2016). 
3.6.6 Domestic Energy Transport 
Inadequate rail capacity has traditionally been a major driver of Chinese imports. Major power 
generation in the south east are geographically removed from the large coal reserves in the 
north and west of the country, as seen in Appendix F (IEA, 1999). Coastal regions accounted 
for over 2,500million tonnes of consumption in 2010, while coastal production accounted for 
just 900million tonnes (Xu, 2015). Chinese railways are ranked the highest in the world in 
terms of tonnages moved, however overland infrastructure is inadequate to service this deficit.  
 
However, these transport bottlenecks are beginning to ease as new linkages open between 
mines in Shanxi and Inner Mongolia. The new linkages are part of a central government 
program fundamentally changing coal transportation, with dedicated rail linkages operating 
 30 
 
from north to south and west to east. Of importance is opening the province of Xinjiang to 
greater exploitation, as central planners look to shift production of coal westwards. With an 
estimated resource of 2.2trillion tonnes (Kirkland, 2011), the province is being targeted as 
China’s ‘national energy strategic base.’ While the westward solution would help reduce 
pollution in large northern population centres, it requires large investment into rail linkages. 
 
The expansion of energy transportation services to Xinjiang is not limited to coal. The 
autonomous region accounts for over a sixth of China’s overall landmass, and presents major 
opportunities in wind, hydro and solar. The region is estimated to have up to 182GW of 
exploitable wind energy, 15GW exploitable hydro and good solar irradiance for massive solar 
exploitation. To unlock the potential of Xinjiang and other inland regions, plans have been 
detailed for 12 UHV (Ultra High Voltage) powerlines to be constructed from western regions 
to the eastern population centres. These lines, along with actual and proposed rail transport 
linkages, are detailed in Appendix G (Collins & Erikson, 2012). Efficient transport of power 
will enable cost effective renewables generation, supplemented by fossil fuels when necessary. 
 
The infrastructure outlined for west to east power transfer represents a significant step in 
reducing imports. As previously mentioned in Section 3.6.4, Chinese coal assets can raise 
production to completely cover domestic demand. The installation of dedicated coal-carrying 
railways would ease overland transport costs and further increase market competition. Chinese 
government plans suggest additions to its rail network boosting capacity to three billion tonnes 
by 2020, from 2.26billion in 2012 (Reuters, 2014). While the installation of UHV powerlines 
and the renewable capacity to justify their introduction is a longer term plan, it suggests a level 
of competition that could price the seaborne trade out of the market. 
3.7 CHINESE POLICY EFFECTS ON AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS 
The direction of the Chinese power mix raises a number of questions about the coal mining 
sector. With decreased energy demand over recent years, the sector has had greater choice in 
where to source coal. Large cuts in import volumes suggests a trend of Chinese firms to turn 
inwards when domestic prices offer price saving opportunities, an important indicator for future 
Chinese-Australian trade relations. Figure 19 displays the actual export tonnage to China from 
Australia over the previous five years by quarter, reflecting the tendency of Chinese buyers to 
turn to domestic product over this period (ABS, 2016). With the increasing role of renewables 
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in the power mix, along with government-driven growth in overland transport of both coal and 
electricity, the Chinese market is increasingly competitive for Australian exporters.  
 
 
Figure 19: Australian coal exports to China by year 
3.8 TECHNOLOGY TO IMPACT EXPORTS 
3.8.1 Efficient Energy from Poor-Quality Coal 
Australia has long been an attractive export partner to Asian and European partners because of 
the high quality of both its thermal and metallurgical coals. This is particularly true in the case 
of China and India, where many power generation companies use the low sulphur and ash 
properties of Australian imports to enhance lower quality domestic product through blending. 
With this competitive advantage, Australian product has been regarded as more resilient to 
drops in seaborne demand, a perception repeatedly demonstrated by the overvaluation of 
Australian exports (see Appendix B). 
 
However, new technology emerging from China may soon negate the Australian competitive 
edge. Advancements first installed at the Waigaoqiao plant – centred around upgraded boiler 
technologies, energy control measures and pollution controls – have made the plant the most 
efficient in the world. Most significantly, the world leading efficiency of 46.5 per cent barely 
diminishes (above 45 per cent) when using low quality coal (Grigg, 2016). These 
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advancements, known as ‘Feng’s 5E Technology,’ could completely change the export market 
in Asia. Inventor Feng Weizhong claims the upgrade, already applied to seven other 
powerplants in China, has a payback period of just five years due to the decreased use of coal. 
Considering Australian coal’s value as a blending product, the advancements are particularly 
significant. The promises outlined in the Made in India program seemed to be detached from 
the reality of coal-fired power generation when they were made in 2014. The government was 
moving to increase powerplant efficiency while eliminating high quality import coals that had 
long been used to raise the quality of poor Indian product. The effect of new technology from 
China, which can be added to Ultra Super Critical powerplants, would be disastrous from an 
Australian export sense. 
3.8.2 Cost of Renewables 
In terms of cost, India and China enjoy a major competitive advantage over the rest of the 
world. In terms of both capital outlay and operating costs, the majority of renewable projects 
in these countries undercut the rest of the world as seen in Figure 20 (IRENA, 2015). With both 
nations targeting solar and wind as major sources of energy in their renewables futures, 
comparatively low installation costs of approximately US$1300/kW and US$1670/kW 
compare well against OECD costs above US$2000/kW for both sources. The underlying 
reasons behind these low costs are primarily the cheap cost of labour and land acquisition in 
both China and India, owed to both low rural property values and favourable government 
policies. 
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Figure 20: Ranges and weighted averages for total installed cost of utility scales renewables 2013-14 
 
From an operating standpoint, Chinese and Indian renewables compare well to OECD 
standards and typical coal-fired energy costs. Solar photovoltaic averages are just above 
US$0.1/KWh, compared to approximately US$0.19/KWh in OECD nations, while onshore 
wind at USD0.06/KWh slightly outperformed OECD averages. Offshore wind, increasingly 
exploited in China, was approximately 60 per cent cheaper to operate than OECD standards. 
Compared to typical fossil-fuelled energy generation costs of US$0.04-0.014/KWh, Chinese 
and Indian renewables represent significant competition. A graphic of these costs, along with 
comparisons to the rest of the world is presented in Appendix H (IRENA, 2015). 
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4 SCENARIO PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
4.1 BASE MODEL 
To evaluate the possible future scenarios, the Forbes Scenario Planning and Strategic 
Forecasting model was employed (Ogilvy, 2015). Breaking down the two key drivers into 
‘growth exceeding expectations’ and ‘stagnation’ scenarios, this method produces four 
outcomes, referred to as export futures. 
 
The most notable example of this method of ‘futures planning’ is Royal Dutch Shell, which 
saw the need for a multi-futures model of forward planning in the late 1960’s. Scenario 
planning has since grown to become an essential function in up to 65 per cent of large 
corporations. Of these futures models, an estimated 85 per cent are based off the original Shell 
model (Wilkinson & Kupers, 2013). According to a 2013 survey of 77 large companies 
conducted through Aarhus University, this procedure of formal “strategic foresight” was found 
to add value through: 
 enhanced ability to perceive change; 
 greater capacity to interpret and respond to that change; 
 influence on other actors; and 
 enhanced capacity for organisational learning. 
After the four possible export futures were identified, the effect on Australian exports were 
quantified through risk factors. As identified by Shell chief economist DeAnne Julius (1993-
97), quantification of futures scenarios is an essential aspect of the process (Wilkinson & 
Kupers, 2013). As the scope of the report did not include predictions for actual mining or 
energy production levels, this assessment was a simple numerical risk weighting rating applied 
to various drivers from learnings during literature review. 
4.1 KEY PARTNERSHIPS 
In terms of stability, China and India are the two most uncertain partnerships moving forward 
for Australian coal exports. Low cost domestic supply gives greater freedom of choice to coal 
users, increasing competition in the energy and steel markets. As seen in Figure 21, using data 
obtained from the RBA (2016), China and India are vital for the continued viability of the coal 
industry in Australia. In India, Australia has a viable metallurgical coal buyer for the 
foreseeable future, given its lack of domestic reserves. However, the growth in demand for 
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imported thermal coal that was predicted before the Modi Government entered office is at risk 
from an Indian drive towards cutting imported coal. China, an important buyer in both markets, 
has reserves to eliminate the need for imports completely. The EIA predict that Chinese output 
will recover from recent shortfalls in the short term and continue to grow to at least 2025 (EIA, 
2016). Analysis conducted by CRU has even pointed towards China transitioning to a net 
exporter of metallurgical coal within 15 years, as shown in Appendix I (Duck, 2016). Deutsche 
Bank forecasted the transition to occur as early as 2020. The ambitious targets set by the 
Chinese and Indian governments makes success in meeting goals hard to predict.  
 
 
Figure 21: Australian coal exports by destination 
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4.2 KEY DRIVERS 
Having limited the scope of the report to changes in demand from China and India, two key 
drivers can be identified that will dictate Australia’s export outlook to 2020. These two drivers 
were identified from research in Section 3 as uniquely important amongst a complex range of 
economic and political factors in shaping the energy futures of both nations. Given the link of 
these energy futures to Australian export quantities also established by this section, the 
outcomes of these factors relate directly to the viability of the Australian coal industry. They 
were identified as follows: 
 growth in renewable energy; and 
 availability of domestic coal. 
4.2.1 Growth in Renewable Energy 
With the commitment of both the Indian and Chinese Governments to renewable power 
established in Section 3, the composition of the energy mix comes into question. While all 
economic indicators point towards growth in energy demand from both nations, the growing 
importance of wind, solar and hydro power sources could severely impact demand for imported 
coal. In the metallurgical market, the rate of growth of renewables is tied to demand. High 
renewables growth rate is caused by high demand for energy, a reflection of economic growth 
in line or exceeding expectations. With high economic growth, the developing economies of 
China and India can be expected to demand more steel, increasing seaborne metallurgical 
prices. 
 
Whether because of rapidly falling prices in renewable generation or to improve pollution 
levels in its rapidly deteriorating population centres, renewables have formed a huge 
component of the Made in India energy program. Among the key targets scheduled for 
implementation by 2022 are as follows: 
 solar capacity of 100GW from 3GW in 2014; 
 wind capacity of 60 GW from 22.4GW in 2014; and 
 hydro capacity of 43GW. 
The rapid renewables growth signals India’s clear intention to follow through on the Paris 
Climate Change Accords commitment of a 33 per cent reduction on 2005 carbon emissions. 
From an import sense, growth through renewables eases the burden on increasing domestic 
coal output and jeopardises the potential relationship between India and Australian thermal 
producers. 
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In 2015, Chinese investment into renewables exceeded US$102billion; more than investment 
in the US and Europe combined. As with India, the price of both installation and operation of 
renewable energy sources in China is fast approaching coal-fired generation. The Chinese 
target of nine per cent non-hydro renewables generation by 2020 is achieved through: 
 200GW on and offshore wind capacity; 
 100GW solar photovoltaic capacity; and 
 4.2billion tonne cap on coal production. 
These targets will be implemented in conjunction with long term proposals for greater 
exploitation of the western province of Xinjiang with additional capacity and the installation 
of 12 UHV powerlines. 
4.2.2 Availability of Domestic Coal 
Despite growth in renewables, coal will continue to play a major role in the power mix of both 
India and China through to 2020 and beyond. From a mining perspective, the growth plans of 
both countries differ significantly. The Chinese, facing an oversupply problem, have moved 
towards shutting down over 4,000 small mines in the past 12 months, shifting the focus to high 
output, mechanised coal mining. India has opened a previously nationalised industry to private 
investment to reach output of 1.5billion tonnes by 2020. In this driver, China has significant 
potential for high levels of growth should the central government decide coal mining and 
transport is once again an investment target. Chinese reports suggest its sizeable industry has 
significant capacity that is still unutilised, requiring development in transport infrastructure. 
The new rail linkages being installed to raise capacity to three billion tonnes by 2020 has the 
potential to give domestic production a massive price advantage over imported product. 
 
In power generation, India currently lacks adequate capacity to provide for the massive 
industrial growth of the Made in India plan. It’s coal-fired fleet is over-utilised, leading to 
efficiency levels comparing poorly on the world scale. The power generation mix that India 
uses to grow overall capacity is likely to require a large increase in coal output, even if it does 
not occur in the short time-frame the government has outlined. A vital component of the 
government plans to stop imports is the effectiveness of the Indian rail network. With major 
coal basins in the east separate to many of the large population centres in the north and west of 
the country, the bottleneck of Indian rail capacity poses a major threat to production. While 
exports in thermal coal are difficult to model, major industrial growth combined with a lack of 
reserves are positive signs for Indian demand for Australian metallurgical coal.  
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5 AUSTRALIAN EXPORT FUTURES 
5.1 EXPORT FUTURES 
Using the model outlined in Section 4, Figure 22 was developed. To provide context for the 
risk weightings produced from this model, each future is explained in detail, including analysis 
of the following areas: 
 changes in power mix; 
 availability of domestic supply and transport capacity; and 
 impact on Australian exports. 
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Figure 22: Export futures developed through Key Drivers 
5.1.1 Coal Intermediary Future 
The Coal Intermediary Future deals with a scenario in which China and India have immediate 
success in reducing imports through dominant local supply. For India, the scenario can only 
occur with massive expansion of mining output occurring in tandem with increasing rail and 
coastal transport capacities. The situation appears more likely in China, with capacity that can 
provide for demand in the near-term without major investment into new projects. 
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The Coal Intermediary Future is perhaps the ideal scenario from a central government 
perspective for both India and China. From an energy perspective, it delivers power to the 
nation as quickly as possible through the dual focuses of expansion of coal capacity and 
investment into renewables. The scenario is characterised by massive investment into 
renewables, rail infrastructure and, in India’s case, mining output. 
Power Mix: 
The power mix of this future will continue to be dominated by coal in the short term. Whilst 
significant renewables capacity is being constructed, coal serves as a stop-gap source of power, 
allowing increased output. In India, this will mean slightly increased use of coal and growing 
importance in the power mix in the short term. Beyond the short term, focus will shift to 
increasing efficiency of powerplants and replacement of outdated, high-emitting models 
already operating far beyond their intended lifespan. 
 
In China, coal’s share of the power mix is unlikely to grow significantly in the short term. 
Power output through coal will be largely capped at current levels with the emergency ban on 
new powerplants initiated in March 2016. The shift to renewables will occur more quickly than 
in India, with investment likely to grow from current levels of US$102billion annually. In a 
2015 report, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences presented its Eco-Efficient scenario, a 
future to 2030 based on its power mix recommendations. As a governmental agency with 
significant influence in Beijing, the scenario gains credibility. Presented visually in Figure 23, 
the scenario predicts peak coal use in 2019, with increased influence of renewables, nuclear 
and other alternatives such as large scale hydro power through to 2030 (Xu, 2015). 
 
Figure 23: Chinese energy mix and demand for coal (orange) in eco-efficient scenario 
16
20
24
28
32
0
10
20
30
40
50
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2025 2030
C
o
al
 D
em
an
d
 (
M
to
e)
C
ap
ac
it
y 
(M
to
e)
Coal Renewables Nuclear Other
 40 
 
Domestic Coal Supply and Transport: 
In India, mining capacity has seen growth figures in the first half of 2016 that suggest the Modi 
Government’s 1.5billion tonne target is not out-of-reach. The Coal Intermediary Future will 
see continued successful expansion of these projects, opening greenfield mines with higher 
levels of mechanisation. The expansion will be led by massive government investment into 
CIL, along with a greater share of production from the private sector, now open to foreign 
investment. New railway infrastructure has begun in earnest to match the rising capacity of 
mines. Nine new projects will absorb around US$3.6billion in funding, and improve capacity 
to a level where it can manage the new mining target by 2020. Also vital is the demand for the 
coal that is produced. While CIL production targets have been met through 2016, a lack of 
demand has contributed to rising pit head stocks which limit mining expansion. 
 
China will continue to shut small, unprofitable mines in the short term, slightly reducing 
capacity and addressing an oversupply issue. However, in the Coal Intermediary Future, large 
state-owned mines will soon begin to increase production to make up for these losses. The 
focus of Chinese energy production will begin to shift westward, better exploiting the 
autonomous territory of Xinjiang. In the short term, imports will remain an important 
component of supply for plants in the south east, however new rail projects will serve as a 
solution to decreasing the net import position. The transport network will be revolutionised in 
the long term with the introduction of 12 ultra-high voltage powerlines that will carry electricity 
generated by both renewables and coal in the west to population centres on the coast. 
Impact on Australian Exports: 
With renewables capacity increasing as planned and beginning to occupy a noticeable share of 
the grid, Indian mining capacity and transport infrastructure will take slightly longer than 
promised. Demand for energy will simply not be high enough to support an increase of the size 
planned. Imports of thermal coal will continue slightly past 2020, however abundant electrical 
supply will aid the government in introducing tariffs to price imports out of the market beyond 
this point. In Australia, Adani will be forced to delay the Galilee Basin because of a lack of 
Indian demand. Without this demand, the low quality of the coal will force abandonment of 
the project.  
 
In China, decreased production in the short term will increase domestic prices and imports will 
rise to past levels. It won’t be until completion of key west-east and north-south rail linkages, 
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allowing heavily producing regions in the north and west access to the coast, that Chinese 
miners can again flood the market and drop domestic prices. Inevitably, this will reduce 
demand for Australian exports, a situation that will worsen as Chinese renewables and nuclear 
begin to eat away at the share of coal in the power mix. The introduction of the planned UHV 
power lines will put a permanent end to Australian thermal exports to China. Overall, the future 
will follow a model similar to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis’ 
(IEEFA), although the timeframe for the scenario in Figure 24 (Buckley, 2015) may be short 
especially in the case of China. 
 
 
Figure 24: Imported coal demand per IEEFA forecasts beyond 2015 
 
Exports of metallurgical coal to India remain relatively secure, even with the introduction of 
the Made in India import ban. While the shift away from thermal imports has been repeated 
regularly by Energy Minister Piyush Goyal, the Modi Government has conceded that imports 
of metallurgical coal cannot be curbed short term. The industrialisation program will require 
record steel output from India, which has no significant metallurgical reserves of its own.  
 
China does hold significant metallurgical reserves, although a large portion are at significant 
depth. In the Coal Intermediary Future, and in all futures, Chinese steel demand is set to drop 
significantly as the economy moves away from investment driven growth. As a percentage of 
total exports to China, Australian metallurgical coal will come to dominate thermal exports. 
However, the increased rail capacity will have the same effect as on thermal exporters, allowing 
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domestic producers to slash prices and make seaborne coal expensive relative to local 
alternates. 
5.1.2 Security Future 
The Security Future deals with lower-than-expected growth in renewable energy sources in 
both countries. The scenario is likely if foreign investment declines, likely caused by 
deteriorating international relations. A shift towards heightened international tension would not 
only eliminate foreign investment, but increase military spending potentially affecting 
spending in domestic power supply. Particularly in the case of China, which has frequently 
clashed politically with the western hemisphere in past decade, this situation is not completely 
unlikely. The second aspect of the scenario is high domestic mining and transport growth. 
Given a souring of international relations would likely cause both China and India to turn 
inwards and quickly sure up local supply, interaction can be seen between the two drivers. 
 
Two major advocates of this energy future were found, in the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 2015 Energy and Climate Outlook for India (Reilly, et al., 2016), and the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in its Current Policies Scenario (Xu, 2015). These 
scenarios have been displayed in visual formats in Appendix J. The MIT outlook for India is 
particularly negative in its assessment of the Made in India plan’s ability to introduce 
renewables to India, suggesting no significant non-coal contribution even up to 2050. Despite 
the desired government direction, MIT advocates for a typical fossil-fuel-intensive build-up 
through industrialisation. The CASS scenario differs only slightly from the Eco-Efficient 
scenario presented with the renewables future. It describes a situation in which renewables are 
introduced at a slower pace. While possibly not a reflection of the severity of renewables 
stagnation under the security future, it does indicate how a small year-on-year difference 
contributes to significant changes beyond 2020. These scenarios are included only as a 
reference as they do properly describe the outcomes of a security future in China and India. 
Power Mix: 
With low renewables growth, the use of coal in the security future is set to rise overall, 
accounting for energy production originally slated for renewables. The effect will be 
particularly obvious in the Chinese market, which can ramp-up production at relatively short 
notice. While actual coal consumption is set to rise in both countries, the effect on the power 
mix will be slightly different. China, already with legislation capping coal consumption and 
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mining capacity, will see reduction in coal’s share of the power mix lag behind targets, however 
it is highly unlikely that the share will increase. Instead, reliance on nuclear power will grow 
to cover increasing demand for power. In India, this future will mean an increase in the share 
of coal in the power mix. With 300million without power, in comparison to China’s current 
oversupply, India cannot afford to scale back total output in the short term. The security future 
will see massive increase in Indian domestic output and reliance on coal and central grid supply, 
inconsistent with the goals of the central government. 
Domestic Coal Supply and Transport: 
From a Chinese perspective, transport is at the centre of the security future. The decreased 
fluency of world trade in this scenario will increase the speed at which the western states are 
developed for energy and coal production. The key is then moving the product to demand 
centres on the coast. This can be achieved either through coal rail transportation or the proposed 
ultra-high voltage powerlines which will also serve renewables production. With the stagnation 
of renewables in this future, the former is more likely. In India, the security future will mean 
massive investment into rail infrastructure, and potentially the use of coastal shipping to utilise 
coal port assets no longer employed by importers. 
Impact on Australian Exports: 
For Australian exports, the Security Future is probably the worst of all outcomes. Increased 
demand for thermal coal is matched by increased domestic supply which, using new rail 
transport infrastructure, can flood the market and lower prices beyond competition. In the 
metallurgical market, slower-than-expected growth in renewables likely means a slow-down 
in the economy and decreased steel production as a result. For China, reduced demand and the 
trend towards self-sufficiency means metallurgical demand will drop significantly. India does 
not have the same ability to increase production, however growth in coking products will be 
lower than expected. While out-of-scope for this investigation, heightened international 
tensions are a potential driver of this scenario, a situation which would impact Australia’s 
balance of trade more broadly than just coal exports. 
5.1.3 Renewables Future 
The Renewables Future represents a pathway where increased international climate pressure 
and inadequate local supply of coal shifts the power mix quickly away from fossil fuels. In the 
short term, imports will remain important as both India and China fail to meet demand with 
domestic supply. As capital infrastructure allows renewable sources significant market 
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penetration, operating costs far below OECD averages will allow these energy sources to be 
economically competitive with coal even without subsidies. 
 
Major advocates for the Renewables Future are the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
2015 Energy and Climate Outlook for China and the Texas-based Institute for Energy 
Economics and Financial Analysis, which predicts declining reliance on coal in both countries. 
Significantly, from the release of MIT’s 2014 Outlook to the 2015 version, predictions for 
China’s success in cutting reliance on coal completely changed, as shown in Figure 25 (Reilly, 
Paltsev, Chen & Sokolov, 2016). The move is consistent with the BP energy outlook over the 
same period, which revised 2035 coal demand down by nearly 250Mtoe (BP, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 25: MIT Energy and Climate Outlook 2050 projections for the Chinese energy mix (2014 vs. 2015) 
Power Mix: 
Of all possible futures, the Renewables Future has the most immediate effect on the power mix 
of both nations. This scenario isn’t desirable from a central planning standpoint, as failure of 
domestic coal operations will force power companies into importing fuel in the short to medium 
term. This increase in cost will likely see shortfalls in total power supply for a period while 
renewables are phased-in to replace fossil fuels. Major investment into renewables would see 
a power mix change almost immediately in China, which currently has far greater scope in 
terms of renewables spending.  
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While renewables represent a major component of the Indian plan, the failure of coal as a 
resource is not foreseeable in the intermediary. Should domestic production fail, the result will 
likely be a turn towards imports rather than a complete shift to other sources of energy. From 
an Indian perspective, the Renewables Future will follow the model of the Import Future in 
the short to medium term, with significant divergence becoming obvious beyond around 2025. 
Until this point, failure to meet coal targets would force the Modi Government to reschedule 
the phase-out of thermal imports. With little current solar or wind infrastructure, it would be 
several years before non-hydro renewables made a significant impact on the power mix.  
Domestic Coal Supply and Transport: 
The first indicator of a Renewables Future would be slower-than-expected growth in domestic 
coal to powerplants, through either inadequate mining output or an inability to transport 
product efficiently. The risk is particularly relevant in India, with adequate domestic supply 
needing to increase rapidly to meet government targets and rail infrastructure not yet close to 
required capacity. The IEA Indian Vision Scenario is an industry report providing possible 
quantitative values for a Renewables Future. Presented visually in Figure 26, renewables 
dominate newly installed capacity, while coal production lags below 950million tonnes 
annually even by 2040, two decades past the original target for 1.5billion tonnes of output 
(IEA, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 26: Indian energy mix and coal production under IEA Indian Vision Scenario 
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In China the issue of transportation is more relevant than mining capacity. While national 
figures would suggest that output can be raised on short notice to meet a rise in demand, 
transporting product from the north and west of the country to population centres in the south 
remains of concern. The Renewables Future would see plans for west-east and north-south 
dedicated coal railways altered, perhaps to push forward the strategy of implementing ultra-
high voltage cables connecting renewable sources in the west to coastal cities.  
Impact on Australian Exports: 
In the short term, the Renewables Future will see Australian thermal imports increase. The 
failure of domestic supply and transport will increase domestic prices. In the short to medium 
term, Indian exports will track the same growth as in the Imports Future, while Chinese demand 
will likely recover to levels seen in 2013/14. However, a long term focus on renewables and 
securing local supply will eventually destroy the export market to both countries. Current 
trends would suggest that China can make meaningful reductions in coal use from 2020 
onwards given an inclination to do so, while the Indian ability to cut coal probably lags behind 
by a decade. 
 
In both the Renewables Future and the Import Future, metallurgical exports stand to benefit 
from a lack of domestic production or transport capacity. Given its reserves, China has the 
ability to supply a declining steel industry with coking coal through domestic operations, 
however the operation relies on the same transport network that impacts thermal self-
sufficiency. While renewable sources stand to replace thermal coal in the long run, an adequate 
replacement for metallurgical coal in the steel-making project has not yet been found, despite 
more extensive use of natural gas in the process of direct reduced iron. 
5.1.4 Import Future 
The Import Future deals with failure of India and China to progress towards both its renewables 
and coal targets and continuing to rely on imports as a solution. Given the current policies of 
both countries, which target nation-wide energy growth as a priority, this energy future 
represents significant economic failures. With a slump in the Chinese and Indian economies, 
this future may also suggest a worldwide downturn, with trade implications extending beyond 
the scope of this investigation. 
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Power Mix: 
In both the Chinese and Indian cases the power mix is difficult to predict in the import future. 
With no form of power being effectively implemented and likely economic difficulty, the 
cheapest option would be favoured by governments and private investors alike. While 
renewables have taken significant steps in decreasing costs, the power mix is likely to be coal-
based. From an Australian government perspective, the import future has been identified as the 
most likely in India at least. 
 
Domestic Coal Supply and Transport: 
In the import future, either a failure in domestic supply, transport, or both, have crippled the 
ability of the sector to produce power. China is in a reasonable position to suffer stagnation in 
the industry without economic failure, as large current mining and transport capacity can better 
weather a downturn as in this scenario. For India, the rapid industrial growth plans laid out in 
the Made in India plan would fail in this scenario. Given the worldwide implications in this 
scenario, foreign investment into India would also be affected. Without the input of large 
overseas firms, sections of the plan assigned to private investment would also fail. 
 
Impact on Australian Exports: 
From an Australian exporters point of view, the import future would seem to be the most 
positive. While uncertainty surrounds this scenario, the nature of coal as the historical base to 
many power mixes and a substitute product to capital intensive renewables technology, 
positions the sector well for a worldwide downturn. Across both metallurgical and thermal 
exports to China and India, risk factors are low. This is the only future where risk to 
metallurgical exports is similar to thermal products. Steel production in the downturn is hard 
to predict, and low demand may impact on seaborne prices. In the scenario, pre-2014 plans 
which do not account for increased Made in India levels of investment again become relevant. 
Analysis conducted into Indian imports by the International Energy Agency in a forecast model 
called the New Policies Scenario, suggests coal import share will continue to grow, reaching a 
maximum just under 40 per cent in 2020. Represented visually in Figure 27, Indian imports of 
both thermal and metallurgical coal would rise in absolute tonnage along with as a percentage 
of total consumption until 2020 (IEA, 2015).  
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Figure 27: Coal imports by origin in IEA New Policies Scenario 
5.2 RISK WEIGHTINGS 
The purpose of evaluating the export futures was not to determine individual likelihood of any 
one scenario, but to assess the risk to Australian coal exports in each of the futures. In each 
future, a separate risk level was determined for both thermal and metallurgical exports to each 
country. Presented in Figure 28, these risk factors were designed to simplify a complex market 
by assigning risk of either ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ or ‘high’ based on likely future seaborne price and 
the subsequent value of Australian exports.  
 
To break the key drivers down into a meaningful weighted analysis for these risk assessments, 
factors were determined for each of the drivers and assigned a rating out of ten. In these ratings, 
ten represented extremely high impact on Australian exports in the scenario while one 
translated into low risk and likely growth in exports. There were three evaluated factors 
assigned a value out of ten, which were 
 coal mined; 
 transport capacity; and 
 renewables capacity (double weighting). 
 
The key driver domestic coal supply growth was broken down into two factors – coal mined 
and transport capacity. Growth in each of these fields was determined to have equal impact on 
demand for imports. Particularly from an Indian standpoint, mining growth must be 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
2000 2005 2013 2020 2030 2040
Im
p
o
rt
 S
h
ar
e
M
to
e
OTHER
SOUTH AFRICA
INDONESIA
AUSTRALIA
 49 
 
accompanied with expansion of the rail network to avoid excessive pit head stocks. The ability 
to generate energy is a result of the amount of coal moved to power generators themselves. As 
transport capacity could only be improved to a maximum determined by mining output, the 
rating assigned was capped at the value given to mining output. The key driver renewables 
growth remained a single factor, which was assigned double weighting to be evaluated out of 
20. This driver was assumed to account for coal demand, with higher renewables output 
translating into lower coal consumption, as it drops in terms of share in the power mix. A more 
detailed explanation on the allocated risk weightings is provided in Appendix K. 
 
 
Figure 28: Impact summary of four possible export futures 
 
As can be seen in Figure 28, the two drivers had significant effect on Australia’s export viability 
with risk factors differing significantly in each future. Thermal coal exports were generally at 
greater risk than metallurgical exports, generally offering less of a competitive edge above 
domestically-sourced products. Of all the futures, the security future offered the worst possible 
outcome for Australian exporters, while the most positive scenario was the import future.  
5.3 EXPORT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
For Australian exporters, the bottom-line for industry viability is the seaborne price. With high 
standards of environmental protection, high wages relative to China and India and 
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comparatively large distances to transport product, high demand and price is essential. In 
analysing Australian production from a cost-based perspective, many mines rank highly 
compared to other exporters. Given this price sensitivity, the decrease in seaborne prices since 
2011 has impacted Australian companies, with no large domestic market to replace income. To 
illustrate the vulnerability of Australian industry, Figure 29 and Figure 30 have been provided, 
overlaying the most recent Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) contract price from Appendix A on 
historical production cost data for world exports (RBA, 2015). 
 
Figure 29: Seaborne thermal coal FOB production costs adjusted for quality (2015) 
 
Figure 30: Seaborne coking coal FOB production costs adjusted for quality (2014) 
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As made clear by these cost curves, low seaborne prices have forced many Australian 
operations into running at a loss, with profitability low across the board. Australian industry 
already benefits from comparatively high levels of mechanisation, leading to low costs per man 
hour for overburden removal, coal mining and transportation to port facilities. The reality is 
that with the cost of Australian labour high compared to competitors in Indonesia, China and 
India, the cost of mining cannot be significantly reduced in most cases. 
 
Without a recovery in the contract price of both metallurgical and thermal coal, Australian 
mines will continue to decrease output and growth will be impossible. Already identified in 
Section 3, is that demand from China and India will largely dictate the direction of Australian 
mining. Should both nations continue their trend of towards thermal self-sufficiency, they will 
continue to drive down seaborne prices and reduce Australian export volumes. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis conducted in this report has highlighted several worrying indicators for the future 
of the Australian coal export industry. The Chinese and Indian markets, as the world’s two 
largest coal importers in 2015, dictate the seaborne price of both thermal and metallurgical 
coal. With Australian coal futures directly tied to exports, the industry’s viability is linked to 
demand from these two countries. Of all the major coal importing nations, China and India 
stand out as volatile markets. A combination of changing mixture of energy sources, cheap 
domestic coal alternatives and an increased drive towards security of supply leaves future 
demand uncertain. As evidenced by the disparity in industry forecasts, depending on when and 
who they were authored by, the future mix of power and growth of the Chinese and Indian 
outputs is impossible to predict with certainty.  
 
In China, the recent trend has been away from both the production and importation of coal. 
Domestic use has decreased since 2013, will some industry analysts predicting peak coal has 
already occurred. While a concerted effort to expand renewables output has been included in 
the Chinese energy plan, the incredible growth predicted for the market will ensure coal still 
plays a major role in any national energy mix. For Australian exporters, decreased coal demand 
and increased domestic transport capacity presents a worrying competitive edge to Chinese 
producers. With the government likely to maintain a 6 per cent import tariff, and Chinese 
technology leading the world in efficiency from poor quality product, the future for Australian 
thermal coal exports is bleak. From a metallurgical standpoint, a slowdown in steel production 
reflects Chinese movement towards a consumer-driven economy. Compared to India, China 
has a greater ability to meet internal coking demand with internal supply, again presenting 
worrying signs for the future of the seaborne price. However, the quality of Australian 
metallurgical exports presents them with a competitive advantage that makes predicting future 
Chinese demand difficult. 
 
The new Made in India plan for industrial growth has completely changed many forecasts for 
the composition and size of the Indian energy mix in 2020. It details renewables expansion 
which is smaller than China’s, but much more noticeable in a smaller energy market. As an 
economy which still lags many years behind the Chinese, the Indian move towards renewables 
is unconventional given the traditional fossil-fuel intensive process of industrialisation. Despite 
the commitment to renewables, coal still forms a vital part of the Made in India plan. While 
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the original goal of 1.5billion tonnes in 2020 is not consistent with the likely levels of demand, 
the build-up in production achieved early in the plan has been significant. Of greatest concern 
to Australian miners is the commitment to cutting coal imports completely by 2020. Touted by 
many analysts pre-2014 as the next driver of thermal seaborne prices, India’s achievement of 
this goal would have significant consequences for Australian industry, despite it not yet being 
a significant partner. For the metallurgical export industry, a lack of quality reserves in India 
provides a level of safety from the cuts of the Made in India plan. Of all the markets, 
metallurgical coal to India is the most secure moving towards 2020. 
 
Given the difficulty of predicting a single future, two drivers were found which were key in 
assessing how the industry is progressing. These two drivers are: 
 growth in renewable energy; and 
 availability of local coal at generators. 
Using outcomes of either ‘growth exceeding expectations’ or ‘stagnation’, these two drivers 
can be used to create four export futures. With time, the progression of China and India towards 
one of the four futures will become more obvious. These futures are the 
 coal intermediary future; 
 security future; 
 renewables future; and the 
 import future. 
 
While the future that China and India will take remains unclear, the analysis has revealed some 
prediction trends. Most notably, the future for Australian metallurgical coal exports is likely to 
be more positive than thermal exports. Demand for metallurgical coal from India remained 
consistently low-risk, given its lack of domestic supply and a lack of competition from other 
countries. In China, where there was a domestic supply, the risk was slightly higher, rated 
‘medium’ in all but one future. The quality of Bowen Basin coal was a value adding trait that 
is likely to contribute to Chinese demand in the future.  
 
Demand for Australian thermal coal was rated as more at risk moving towards 2020. In three 
of the four futures, forward demand for this product was rated at ‘medium’ or ‘high’ risk for 
both countries. While Australian thermal coal is generally high quality, transport distances and 
counter-competitive government tariffs leave it at risk of being priced out of increasingly 
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competitive Chinese and Indian markets. On the balance of probability, recovery in the 
seaborne price is unlikely to occur long term. This is of concern to Australian miners, which 
have relatively high costs compared to the seaborne exporters average. 
 
Ultimately, effective planning for Australian coal exporters must revolve around flexibility in 
this time of uncertain seaborne prices. With almost no influence on a price largely dictated by 
the seaborne markets swing buyer in China, Australian focus should turn towards reducing 
costs and locating potential partners elsewhere. However, while most indicators aren’t positive 
for the industry, the future remains uncertain and all possible futures should be modelled to 
reduce impact on Australian coal. 
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7 APPENDIX 
Appendix A:  Metallurgical and Thermal Contract Prices 
 
Appendix A-1: Metallurgical coal contract price since 2005 
 
 
 
Appendix A-2: Thermal coal contract price since 2005  
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Appendix B:  NSW Government royalties’ revenue 
 
Appendix B-1: New South Wales Government royalties’ revenue versus actual since 2009. Outlooks 
continuously overestimate actual revenue. 
 
Appendix C:  Indian electricity breakdown 
 
Appendix C-1: Breakdown of the Indian population showing the disadvantaged rural population without access 
to electricity in India.  
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Appendix D:  Main coal mining areas and infrastructure 
 
Appendix D-1: Main coal mining basins in India with port facilities shown. Identifies future prospects in coastal 
shipping should India reduce import volume. 
 
Appendix E:  GDP of selected countries 1990-2014 
 
Appendix E-1: Gross domestic product of China compared to the United States and India. China is a much 
larger economy than India and is approaching the size of the US.  
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Appendix F:  Distribution of China's coal reserves 
 
Appendix F-1: Distribution of China’s coal reserves by province. Reserves are concentrated in the north and 
west of the country. 
 
Appendix G:  Power routes out of Xinjiang 
 
Appendix G-1: Planned ultra-high voltage transmission lines with planned and existing coal rail linkages out of 
the Chinese province of Xinjiang.  
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Appendix H:  Cost of electricity generation 
 
Appendix H-1: Cost of electricity generation by kilowatt-hour in selected regions in 2014. China and India 
continuously outperform OECD averages in key renewables technologies. 
 
Appendix I:  Forecast of Chinese met. coal trade 
 
Appendix I-1: Forecast of Chinese metallurgical coal trade to 2035 by industry analyst CRU  
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Appendix J:  Security Future - advocating agency scenarios 
 
 
Appendix J-1: Chinese energy breakdown with coal demand (orange) in CASS Current Policies Scenario 
 
 
Appendix J-2: Indian energy breakdown from MIT 2050 Scenario 
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Appendix K: Risk future ratings tables 
 
COAL INTERMEDIARY FUTURE 
 
CHINA INDIA 
 
Thermal Met. Thermal Met. 
Coal Mined 9 6 9 1 
Transport Capacity 8 8 6 1 
Renewables/Steel Growth 14 4 12 2 
Total 31 18 27 4 
Risk High Medium High Low 
Appendix K-1: Coal intermediary future risk ratings table 
 
SECURITY FUTURE 
 
CHINA INDIA 
 
Thermal Met. Thermal Met. 
Coal Mined 
10 
8 10 1 
Transport Capacity 10 8 8 1 
Renewables/Steel Growth 9 8 8 8 
Total 29 24 26 10 
Risk High Medium High Low 
Appendix K-2: Security future risk ratings table 
 
RENEWABLES FUTURE 
 
CHINA INDIA 
 
Thermal Met. Thermal Met. 
Coal Mined 
7 
6 4 1 
Transport Capacity 7 6 4 1 
Renewables/Steel Growth 15 2 15 2 
Total 29 14 23 4 
Risk High Medium Medium Low 
Appendix K-3: Renewables future risk ratings table 
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IMPORT FUTURE 
 
CHINA INDIA 
 
Thermal Met. Thermal Met. 
Coal Mined 
5 
2 4 1 
Transport Capacity 5 2 2 1 
Renewables/Steel Growth 4 6 3 8 
Total 14 10 9 10 
Risk Medium Low Low Low 
Appendix K-4: Import future risk ratings table 
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